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Introduction: A Westward Gaze  
Americans have always looked to the west and considered it as part of their birthright.  
Manifest Destiny has been at the heart of the American psyche even before the term for the 
extension of the United States across the continent was coined.  In the 19th and 20th century 
American involvement in the Pacific, the world’s largest ocean has become the new frontier for 
a nation upon which the wilderness has always exercised an irresistible pull.  The line between 
civilization and the wild frontier has shifted throughout time in an inexorable move westward.  
Like a glacier, the movement was slow, unstoppable, and forever changed the land as it passed.  
In the early 18th century that line was the Appalachian Mountains, then the Mississippi, then 
the rising star of Chicago.1 The line between the old world and the new.  The line between 
stagnation and opportunity.  The frontier was where a person could remake themselves and 
bring civilization and progress to a “Garden of Eden”2  This space was where the United States 
could project its hopes, dreams, and global ambitions away from the influence of the “Old 
World”.    
This project seeks to understand how American foreign policy developed during the 19th 
and 20th centuries and how this policy was linked to American expansionism.  I also seek to 
understand how American ideas about race influenced interactions with East and Southeast 
Asian nations.  The shifting racial perceptions of the peoples that Americans came in contact 
with were crucial in the way in which official government policy and propaganda was drafted.  I 
further examine these interactions chiefly from the American perspective but will also draw on 
                                                     
1 Cumings, Bruce. Dominion from Sea to Sea: Pacific Ascendancy and American Power. New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2009. pp. 14-21. 
2 Ibid. pp. 14-15. 
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resources that outline the perceptions of Americans in World War II and during the Cold War by 
the Japanese and Chinese respectively.  I argue that all of the American conflicts from the 
Indian Wars of the 19th century to the American conflict in Vietnam are all a part of the same 
imperial project that has developed and grown in its scope and agenda as the United States has 
expanded westwards.  I further outline American foreign policy by demonstrating how it is 
linked with domestic policy in the United States, specifically in regards to the Civil Rights 
movement during the Cold War, and how the treatment of African-Americans domestically 
undermined the agenda of the United States on the world stage. 
The final portion of this project will seek to examine the motivations for and the actual 
involvement of the United States in Vietnam.  Because of the hold that the Vietnam War exerts 
on the modern psyche of the United States, a wealth of literature has been written on the 
topic.  The work I draw my inspiration from is David Kaiser’s 2001 work American Tragedy.  This 
work pointed me into looking more closely into the policies of the Eisenhower administration.   
For this project I draw upon a number of primary and secondary sources.  The primary 
sources I will engage with come from the Eisenhower presidential library in Abilene Kansas.  
These documents provide an insight into the decision making of one of America’s most beloved 
leaders and show a darker side to his administration.  The actions and policies during 
Eisenhower’s term in office were crucial in involving the United States irrevocably in Southeast 
Asia.  I therefore seek in this project to delve more deeply into what caused the United States 
to become entrenched in a conflict eight and a half thousand miles away. 
An important secondary source that I am in conversation with  is the work of John 
Dower in his book War Without Mercy examining the role of race and the effect it had on the 
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brutal nature of World War II in the Pacific.3  Dower’s study of the interaction and American 
racial perceptions during the war provides a crucial source for this project.  In a similar vein, the 
work of Michael Hunt and Adam Levine on American imperial aspirations in the Pacific lends a 
useful tool in understanding the broader context of American conflict in the region and the 
effects that this involvement had on a broader scale.4  Their work connects the American Wars 
in the Pacific and provides me with a framework for understanding the foreign policy of the 
United States not as separate events, but rather as inexorably linked.  I will further support this 
claim with Bruce Cumings book Dominion From Sea to Sea.  This work discusses the origins of 
American expansionism and how the ideals applied by American policy makers to the Native 
American population can be applied decades and even centuries later to how the United States 
thought of Asian peoples.5 Another important work that I will engage with in this discussion in 
Akira Iriye’s work in Across the Pacific.  This examination of American-Asian relations provides 
an excellent example of a broad and continuous picture of foreign policy.6 The final part of my 
project will address the role that the Civil Rights movement played in influencing the foreign 
policy of the United States.  This piece will primarily examine the policies during Eisenhower’s 
time in office, and to this extent I engage with the argument from David Kaiser’s work.    
                                                     
3 Dower, John W. War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War. New York: Pantheon 
Books, 1986. Print. 
4 Hunt, Michael H., and Steven I. Levine. Arc of Empire: America's Wars in Asia from the 
Philippines to Vietnam. Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina, 2012. Print. 
5 Cumings, Bruce. Dominion from Sea to Sea: Pacific Ascendancy and American Power. New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2009. 
6 Iriye, Akira. Across the Pacific; An Inner History of American-East Asian Relations. New York: 
Harcourt, Brace & World, 1967. Print. 
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I am in agreement with Mary Dudziak’s book Cold War and Civil Rights on the 
importance that the American treatment of African Americans had in the broader context of 
the Cold War. The international perception of the plight of African Americans in the United 
States severely crippled the credibility of the United States on the international stage.7  The 
attitudes displayed domestically in regards to Native Americans and the African American 
population of the United States, were also reflected in American foreign policy.  This can be 
seen in the documents from the Eisenhower administration and the policies that resulted.  
These policies served to ensure American involvement in Vietnam and a crucial component of 
these documents was an American conception of inherent racial superiority.  It is because of 
this that the integration of domestic issues of race are so crucial to understanding why the 
Eisenhower administration established policies that deeply involved the United States in 
Vietnam.  Furthermore these policies are inextricably linked with the broader context of the 
global Cold War.  
Given the controversial nature of the war in Vietnam, three different eras of literature 
have emerged in thinking about the nature and significance of the conflict.  These eras of 
scholarship are the “bad war”, revisionist, and post-revisionist periods.8  My work is in 
conversation with all of these eras of scholarship, but I engage most with the post-revisionist 
period.  The post-revisionist era has largely returned to earlier critiques of the war during the 
“bad war” period, particularly in regards to examining the presidential decisions and policies 
                                                     
7 Dudziak, Mary L. Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy. 
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000. 
8 Richter, Bryan. The Hidden Architect: Dwight Eisenhower’s Cold War Policies and the Vietnam 
War. 2014. 
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regarding the Cold War and Vietnam specifically. As opposed to previous eras of discussion 
regarding Vietnam, the current areas of study have become much more historic as opposed to 
journalistic in its study.  This has been made possible by recent declassification of documents 
that add depth to the materials that can be drawn upon to study the war and decisions leading 
up to it.  Building off of the new area of international study is new research like that of two 
books have been published by Ilya Gaiduk and Qiang Zhai who wrote The Soviet Union and the 
Vietnam War (1996) and China and the Vietnam War (2000) respectively, that discusses the 
historic viewpoint of the war which has been traditionally ignored.9  This new school of thought 
particularly regarding the presidential policy aspect is what my archives and research will 
contribute to.  In a similar vein to David Kaiser’s work, I will seek to examine the policy decisions 
of Eisenhower’s administration.  However, my addition to the academic discussion is the 
inclusion of racial attitudes both domestically and internationally.  The relation of domestic 
policy towards Native Americans and African Americans, and the international policy, 
particularly in regards towards to Vietnam, are my contribution to the literature regarding Cold 
War scholarship.     
Methodologically I approach my research with the understanding that domestic and 
foreign policy are two sides of the same coin.  Both aspects of governmental policy are affected 
by and are extensions of one another.  This approach allows me to develop a richer portrait of 
American involvement in the Pacific and how this involvement did not exist in a vacuum.  It is 
                                                     
9 Ibid. pg. 2. & Ilya V. Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1996; 
Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975 Chapel Hill NC: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2000. 
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dangerous to ignore what occurs domestically while trying to understand the interaction of 
states on the internationally and vice versa.  This is especially true in the case of the United 
States.   
More than any other nation on Earth, race has been the catalyst for many critical events 
in the history of the United States. This importance is reflected in the American Civil War, the 
treatment of Native Americans, and in westward expansion.  The vital importance of the 
interplay between race and foreign policy continued from America’s very inception and into the 
Cold War period.  The inherent superiority contained with American expansion caused the 
United States to engage in conflicts and military actions across the globe.  While there has been 
a great deal that has been written about each of these topics individually, there has not been a 
large body of work that ties racial attitudes with the large scale policy decisions.  To tie all of 
these conversations together is one of the primary objectives of this project.  By understanding 
all of these components together, a more accurate picture of past international relations of the 
United States can be seen.  Only through understanding these past interactions, can we hope to 
avoid the mistakes of the past.  The reasons behind the war in Vietnam are of particular interest 
me given how deeply intertwined my family history is with the conflict and the profound impact 
it has had on my family and I on a personal level.  
On March 26th, 1969 my uncle Donald Richter was killed in action in Tay Nihn province in 
South Vietnam.  He served in the 2nd battalion of the 12th Air Cavalry as a Private First Class.  He 
served as a door gunner in a Huey transport helicopter and during a pickup of troops, the unit 
they were picking up came under heavy enemy fire in the landing zone.  To ensure that the 
troops could be safely picked up, my uncle disembarked from the helicopter and using his M60 
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heavy machine gun, provided covering fire on enemy positions.  In the course of this action, he 
was mortally wounded and died in the air on the way back to the field hospital.  As a result of 
his bravery in the line of duty he posthumously received the Silver Star and the rank of corporal.  
The sacrifice that my uncle made in the jungles of Vietnam, provides me with a constant 
reminder of the importance of my research.  If the United States wants to avoid future conflicts 
like Vietnam, it is imperative that we understand how we become involved.  It was this 
connection to Vietnam, which first caused me to delve into the causes of the war and led me to 
collection of documents I uncovered at the Eisenhower Library. 
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Manifest Destiny and the Origins of Empire 
 American imperial ambitions were not the result of an instantaneous or alchemical 
process.  Rather, it was gradual and constantly shifting process.  This process that led to these 
ambitions began in the centuries of the nation’s founding and was a constant source of 
motivation and mission in the American Revolutionary project.  The west represented 
opportunity and fresh start for American society.  The movement away from Europe typified 
the trajectory of American society.  The space in which the United States could develop an 
identity separate from that of Old World was that of westward expansion.  This expansion 
began with the development of the frontier in present day Mississippi, Alabama, and Georgia in 
what became known as the Deep South.10  While the insatiable appetite for land and 
commercial enterprise drove the settling of this land, it inevitably led to conflict with the 
populace who called these regions home.  This precedent of conflict with indigenous people on 
lands the United States sought to control would return in later decades.  However, this trend 
began with Native American populace of the United States.  The campaign to remove or 
eliminate the Natives, had a distinctly racial component to it.  The “vacant” Garden of Eden 
Americans imagined the west to be was complicated by the presence of Indian nations.   
The Native Americans were viewed as subhuman, and therefore, fairness and mercy 
were unnecessary when dealing with them.  More than any other factor, disease was 
responsible for the demise of the native populace of the Americas.  At the time of Columbus’ 
                                                     
10Rothman, Adam. Slave Country: American Expansion and the Origins of the Deep South. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2005. Print.  
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arrival in the “New World” the population of North America was roughly seven million people, 
but by 1600 had been reduced to 1 million.11  Following rapid European colonization and 
military campaigns against the native populace, by 1900 the native populace in North America 
numbered an infinitesimal 220,000 to 300,000.12  The unprecedented level of racially motivated 
slaughter that typified these conflicts would be seen in later American conflicts.  An account of 
F. Trench Townsend from England recounts the attitude held by soldiers and settlers of the 
frontier.  “He came to understand the ‘justice and necessity’ of annihilating ‘every Redskin we 
should meet- man, woman and child.”13    Bruce Cumings argues, native populations were 
incapable of dealing with a nation united against them in conquest.  By the time the United 
States was formed, Native populaces had become so devastated by disease, war, and tribal 
factionalism that the conquest of the American west was essentially a foregone conclusion.14  
As a result of this relatively easy conquest, Americans believed that God had preordained the 
American push westward and that it was the duty of the United States to extend its hegemony 
from the West Coast of the United States into the great Pacific itself. Along with a duty to 
conquer the land, was a responsibility to civilize any non-white populations that they came 
across. It was with this civilizing mission that the United States embarked upon its first foray 
colonization.  The year was 1899. 
                                                     
11 Cumings, Bruce. Dominion from Sea to Sea: Pacific Ascendancy and American Power. New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2009. pg. 27. 
12 Ibid. pg. 28. 
13 Ibid. pg. 34. & Townshend, F. Trench. Ten Thousand Miles of Travel, Sport and Adventure. 
London: Hurst & Blackett, 1869. Print. pp. 148-149. 
 
14 Ibid. pg. 29. 
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New technologies such as the steam ship and long range cannons made the world seem 
smaller and caused the United States to seek new territories with which to exert influence and 
preserve its national security.15  The Philippines war marked an important milestone for 
American expansion.  It was the first American incursion into a distinctly Asian nation and 
established the nation’s first and only colony in the Pacific.  As American imperial aspirations 
began to come to the fore, this sense of the anglo-saxon right to rule was exported from the 
the shores of California to the beaches of the Philippines. As a result of the Spanish-American 
War, and the United States quick defeat of Spanish Naval forces defending the chain of islands, 
it opened the door for American ground forces to secure a base in Asia.  This is exactly what 
President McKinley ordered American forces to do in the Phillipines.16   
By doing so, McKinley committed the United States to an imperial project in Asia that 
began with the establishment of this colony and its subsequent pacification in a similar manner 
to that of the Native Americans.  The viewpoint of the Filipinos was of a politically and societally 
immature culture and therefore incapable of self-rule.17  Racially charged comments like 
Mckinley’s would become commonplace in the rhetoric of American leaders in the years to 
come.  In resistance to American conquest of the archipelago, native resistance groups shifted 
their focus from conventional warfare and geared up to fight a guerilla campaign against the 
island chain’s new colonial power, the United States. This was to be an entirely different 
experience from their struggle with the Spanish.  The wealth and military power the Americans 
                                                     
15 Hunt, Michael H., and Steven I. Levine. Arc of Empire: America's Wars in Asia from the 
Philippines to Vietnam. Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina, 2012. Print. pg. 12.  
16 Ibid. pg. 16. 
17 Ibid. pg. 17 
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could bring to bear exceeded that of the waning Spanish empire who lacked the funds to 
sustain any significant number of ground troops.  The United States’ replied to this resistance 
and sent 75,000 troops supported by adequate supplies, infrastructure and a flood of 
volunteers to augment their forces.  The Filipinos, hurriedly assembled a force to resist this new 
threat but without the naval and artillery capabilities of the United States were nearly always 
routed.18  In this way, the war in the Philippines took on the same atmosphere of the Indian 
Wars on the continental United States, and many of the soldiers perceived the war in this 
context. McKinley’s successor, Teddy Roosevelt, thought of the conflict as part of the same 
struggle.   
“If Indians and Filipinos go down before American power, then they must be identical: 
‘Everything that was said for Aguinaldo could be said for Sitting Bull.’  Only foolish 
idealist would fail to understand that if you left the continent to the Indians it would 
become ‘nothing but a game preserve for squalid savages.’…Roosevelt was preeminent 
in pushing manifest destiny beyond the continent, linking Indian fighting to imperial 
adventure and the westering of the American people, and Anglo-Saxons to the ‘great 
fighting races’.  Jefferson’s empire of liberty had turned into Roosevelt’s imperialism- 
‘we but pitch the tents of liberty farther westward.”19  
Therefore the conquest of the Philippines was the natural next piece of the American mission 
to civilize the savagery of the Native Americans of North America. 
The commanding officers and generals of the war in the Philippines were veterans of 
the Native American conflicts.  While in the initial phase of the war, the American forces were 
composed primarily of volunteer regiments like the 13th Minnesota, by 1901 regular Army 
                                                     
18 Ibid. pg. 33 
19 Cumings, Bruce. Dominion from Sea to Sea: Pacific Ascendancy and American Power. New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2009. Pg. 138. & Slotkin, Richard Gunfighter Nation 
: The Myth of the Frontier in Twentieth- Century America. Norman: University of Oklahoma 
Press. 1992. Print. pp. 106-107, 109-111. 
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troops had taken over the war with a number of African-American troops entering into the 
conflict.  The racial components of the conflict became even more pronounced.  The black 
American soldiers felt discrimination at the hands of their fellow white soldiers who hurled the 
same slurs against them as they did against the Filipino enemy.20  Despite this obvious source of 
common grievance between African-American soldiers and their enemy, the Black soldiers 
considered the Filipinos in the same manner as the white soldiers did.  They viewed the 
Filipinos as uncivilized and childlike, requiring the intervention of the more advanced American 
culture in society to educate them.21  In this way, black American soldiers took up the symbolic 
“white man’s burden” in civilizing and Americanizing the country.22  
 After the professional troops had taken over the majority of the fighting in the conflict, 
racial tensions escalated to their highest levels.  This was brought on primarily by the shift to 
guerrilla warfare and the ensuing frustration of the American soldiers trying to fight and enemy 
that often couldn’t be found or identified.23 The frustration led to the frequent use of terms 
among American troops like gugu, and gook that would become commonplace throughout 
American wars in Asia.24 Along with name calling, persecution and torture of captured Filipino 
soldiers and civilians believed to be supporters of the “rebels” intensified to unprecedented 
levels.  Entire villages were razed to the ground and their populations either deported to other 
parts of the islands or simply massacred.25  This legacy of racially motivated soldiers is 
                                                     
20Cumings, Bruce. Dominion from Sea to Sea: Pacific Ascendancy and American Power. New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2009. pg. 38. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. pg. 39. 
23 Ibid. pg. 40. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
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noteworthy and would reappear in later conflicts in the Pacific and East Asia.  Upon contact 
with the enemy, many soldiers acknowledged the humanity and cleverness of their enemy 
rather than dismissing them as inhuman beasts.   
However, when the war took on a guerrilla aspect, the Filipinos became dehumanized 
and racist attitudes and practices began to rule the day.  Furthermore, the conflict in the 
Philippines announced to the nations of Asia that despite its rhetoric to the contrary, the 
United States had no interest in the self-determination of Asiatic nations and established a 
colonialist legacy that would come to the fore from World War II through the Vietnam War.  
However, after McKinley’s assassination in 1901, Theodore Roosevelt took office and shifted 
the doctrine of Manifest Destiny even more deeply into the Pacific arena. 
Despite increased Pacific involvement during this period, the United States was still 
Atlanticist in its leanings.  However, Roosevelt sought to change that.  He realized that the 
arena where the United States could project its ascendant power was in the Pacific.  His 
nationalist vision for the United States was a nation that encompassed both the Atlantic and 
the Pacific.26  In this way America represented the new world order, and Europe the old.  While 
the recently acquired Philippines directly reflected Old World concepts of empire, the future 
relations in East Asia were in Roosevelt’s ideas to be a different kind of relationship.  Rather 
than direct control, East Asia would be “opened” to American economic interests and 
influence.27  American’s had always been interested in the affairs of the Atlantic world, but the 
focus on the Pacific created a new global dynamic to American ambitions.  Members of the 
                                                     
26 Cumings, Bruce. Dominion from Sea to Sea: Pacific Ascendancy and American Power. New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2009. Pg. 137. 
27 Ibid. pg. 139. 
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American political establishment reflected the incredible opportunity that the defeat of the 
Spanish and consequent conquest of the Philippines had provided the United States.  The 
American ambassador to Great Britain, Whitelaw Reid provided an interesting insight into 
American domination of the Pacific.  
“Practically we own more than half the coast on this side, dominate the rest, and have 
midway stations in the Sandwhich and Aleutian Islands.  To extend now the authority of 
the United States over the great Philippine Archipelago is to fence in the China Sea and 
secure an almost equally commanding position on the other side of the Pacific- doubling 
our control of it and the fabulous trade the Twentieth Century will see it to bear.  Rightly 
used, it enables the United States to convert the Pacific Ocean almost into an American 
lake.”28      
 As the United States moved to establish its control over the Pacific, the Japanese also working 
to create an Empire of their own. 
In the early 20th century, technological advances economically, militarily, and societally 
were making great strides throughout Europe.  Japan seeking to make itself a power on the 
world stage cast aside its traditional culture and engaged in the rapid process of modernization.  
Japan sought to be able to compete with the Western powers that had been carving apart Asia 
for so long.  To become a world power and save Japan from the imperial ambitions of western 
nations, Japan had to join these “advanced nations” on the international stage.29  By joining the 
“European League of Nations”, Japan would ensure its survival and prosperity in the new global 
world.  Furthermore, Japan needed to establish its dominance over Asia in order to save it from 
the machinations of the west.  Essential to this new assertion of power was China.  By asserting 
                                                     
28 Ibid. pg. 141. & Healy, David. US Expansionism; the Imperialist Urge in the 1890s. Madison: U 
of Wisconsin, 1970. Print. pg. 174. 
29Iriye, Akira. Across the Pacific; an Inner History of American-East Asian Relations. New York: 
Harcourt, Brace & World, 1967.  Pg. 65.  
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itself into Asia, Japan would ensure both that they would be taken seriously by other 
“developed nations” and they would gain a greater sphere of influence in Asia.30  As this shift 
towards western ways of government and institutions was occurring, Japan also emphasized 
the traditional culture more and more in order to establish themselves as unique from the 
powers of the west.  Japan readily adopted the narrative of eastern versus western and set 
themselves up in vehement defense of what they viewed as their sphere of influence.31     The 
antagonism that existed between Japan and the United States only intensified as Japan 
emerged as a larger threat to American security.  With Japan’s crushing victory over the 
Russians in the 1904 Russo-Japanese War, they emerged as true global force to be reckoned 
with.32   
Japan’s continued policy of expansionism led them to come into increasing conflict with 
the United States over which nation had the right to exert its influence in Pacific.  The path of 
empire that the Japanese had laid for themselves made war with the United States, who 
harbored similar interests, increasingly likely.  Japan’s invasion of a weakened China in 1931 
firmly exerted their imperial ambitions, and the country’s militarism earned the condemnation 
of the United States and its allies.  The resulting antagonism made the outbreak of war between 
the two powers ever more likely.  But it would not be until Europe became embroiled in conflict 
that the cauldron of resentment between the United States and Japan would overflow. 
While the narratives of World War II in Europe are understood through a lens of moral 
struggle against the forces of Nazi tyranny, the Pacific theater is far more complex.  Unlike in 
                                                     
30 Ibid. pg. 66. 
31 Ibid. pg. 68. 
32 Ibid. pp. 106-108. 
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Europe, the easily comprehended struggle of good versus evil was forced to make way for a 
conflict more easily understood through traditional motivations.  That is to say both sides were 
concerned with obtaining power, wealth, and territory.  These more concrete objectives clash 
with American perceptions of World War II as a heroic struggle to stop a tyrant.  While these 
concrete objectives were in place, the notion of American ascendency across North American 
and extending their hegemony into the Pacific rose to the forefront of the conflict.  The rise of 
Japan as a world power caused the two forces of American expansionism to clash with that of 
Japanese Imperialism and this in turn led to conflict.  While the United States viewed the Pacific 
and Asia as inside the American sphere of influence, Japan perceived the international political 
situation in a different light. 
Japan saw itself as a force that could unify Asia against the west under the umbrella of 
the Japanese Empire.33  This Pan-Asian movement would consolidate the Japanese as the ruling 
power in Asia while preserving the status-quo in global relations.  By 1941, Germany and Italy 
had succeeded in taking control of the European continent.  The USSR had also been 
neutralized through the German and Soviet non-aggression pact of 1939.34  Matsuoka Yosuke, 
who served as Japanese foreign minister from 1940-1941, saw a world divided into 4 distinct 
regions of influence.  Japan would hold sway over all of Asia in their Pan-Asian vision for the 
continent.  Germany and Italy would have hegemony over Europe, and lastly the United States 
and the Soviet Union would remain neutral and maintain their current hegemons in the 
Western Hemisphere and Russia respectively.35 This system would allow Japan to extend its 
                                                     
33 Ibid. pg. 173. 
34 Ibid. Pg.  209. 
35 Ibid.  
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control over Asia without involving the United States or the Soviet Union in a global conflict.  
However, in adhering to this line of thought, they severely underestimated the United States 
interest in the Pacific.  The United States believed that if the threat of force was applied the 
Japanese as lacking the level of resources and troops the United States could muster, would 
fold under the threat of force.  The Japanese conversely believed that the United States could 
be bought off with favorable trade deals that would encourage the United States to remain 
neutral in any conflict.36   These fictitious perceptions of one another led both nations down a 
path to war.  The stage had been set for the conflict on a global scale for the second time in 
twenty years.  The struggle for supremacy was also typified by the underpinnings of race 
struggle.  Both sides viewed the other as inhuman and therefore necessary that they be 
exterminated.  
The war was especially brutal from its outset with the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor 
in 1941.  The surprise attack on the headquarters of the American Pacific fleet served to 
confirm American perceptions of Asians as untrustworthy and treacherous.  Racial concerns 
underpinned the United States’ understanding of the nature of the war in ways that simply did 
not apply in the conflict against Germany.37  As close racially to Anglo-Saxons, in the eyes of 
many Americans at the time, the Germans were more similar than Asiatic or Slavic peoples.  
American ire was particularly directed at Asians and had been for years harkening back to the 
first arrivals from China.   
                                                     
36 Ibid. pp. 218-219. 
37 Dower, John W. War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War. New York: Pantheon 
Books, 1986. Pg. 36. 
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The first impression that many Americans had of Chinese was of the unskilled “coolie” 
laborers and other temporary laborers that had arrived in the United States prior to 1868.38  
More than this, was the perception of Chinese society as immoral and the Qing dynasty as cruel 
and in humane towards its citizens.  It was feared that the stereotypical vices of opium, 
gambling, prostitution, and organized crime would pollute American society more as greater 
numbers of Chinese flooded into the country.39  Furthermore, Chinese were viewed as 
backward and stubbornly set in their ways particularly compared with the Japanese.  In this 
early stage of American- East Asian relations, the average American considered Asians to be of 
no account.40  Despite these early perceptions of Chinese, it is interesting to note that early 
perceptions of Japan and the Japanese people were extremely positive.  When the Japanese 
envoy first arrived in 1860, it was met with enthusiasm and hospitality, in sharp contrast to the 
way in which Americans welcomed the Chinese delegates just eight years later.  The press in 
the United States aided in this perception.  The Japanese delegation was given further 
credibility by the lack of an American representative in their party. When the Chinese 
delegation visited they appeared to be under the leadership and therefore dominion of 
American diplomat Anson Burlingame.41  While his lobbying on behalf China captivated his 
audiences, he could not remove the common perception of the coolie workers.42  Japan in the 
other hand was free of the domination of westerners in the delegation.  Furthermore, the 
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Japanese were interested to learn all that they could about American culture and society.  
Americans saw this action in a very favorable light.   
“All of this served to confirm the image of Japan casting aside its policy of seclusion and 
eagerly turning to America for friendship and guidance.  Subsequent visits by students 
and officials everywhere repeated the same pattern.  Americans extended their cordials 
welcome to Japanese studying at Ann Arbor, Harvard, and Rutgers.  Some, like T. L. 
Harris, invited Japanese youths to participate in their religious communities.  Other like 
Walt Whitman, wrote poems about their sight of Japanese visitors.  Some of the most 
distinguished American educators responded to the request from the Japanese legation 
in Washington that they offer suggestions for educational reform in the new Japan.  
Japanese seemed to be intent on learning all they could from America.”43 
This earlier perception of Japanese as the staunchest American ally in East Asia would change 
as Japan continued to gather power until the nations clashed after Pearl Harbor.  
  With the seeming confirmation of Asian treachery in the minds of many Americans, the 
war began in earnest.  The government rushed to play off of all the negative perceptions of 
Asians that had been held in the United States for years.  Most propaganda of World War II 
portrayed Japanese as a kind of ape-like creature.  The feeling of the American soldier regarding 
the state of the Japanese can adequately be summed up in the words of Journalist Ernie Pyle.  
“But out here I gathered that the Japanese were looked upon as something subhuman and 
repulsive; the way some people feel about cockroaches or mice.”44  This labeling of the 
Japanese as vermin to be stamped out, contributed significantly to the extreme brutality of the 
war in the Pacific.  The war took on racial connotations not only in the American context, but in 
the context of the survival of the white race.  From its earliest beginnings, the conflict was 
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framed not only in racial sense but also as crucial to the survival of Western civilization.  The 
East and West were in a continuous struggle for supremacy within the world.  The East 
represented uniformity and “blandness in life” while the West represented “life as rich and 
fruitful as possible in varied material and spiritual achievement.”45 Western scholars like Alfred 
T. Mahan also argued that Western civilizations had the duty to rule over inferior societies like 
those in the East.46 However, as Eastern societies modernized as mandated by the west, fear 
began to spread that these Eastern societies would supplant the west.47   
 Furthermore, it was because of the superiority of the white race that victory would be 
won by the allies over their “subhuman” enemy.  In a speech to his troops in 1943, General 
Thomas Blamey showed the precise level of hate for their Japanese foe.   
“You have taught the world that you are infinitely superior to this inhuman foe against 
whom you were pitted.  Your enemy is a curious race- a cross between the human being 
and the ape.  And like the ape, when he is corned he knows how to die.  But he is 
inferior to you, and you know it, and that knowledge will help you to victory.  We must 
go on to the end if civilization is to survive.  We must exterminate the Japanese.”48   
Belief in the inhumanity of the Japanese was propagated by and promoted both by existing 
Anglo-Saxon biases coupled with propaganda campaigns depicting the Japanese as subhuman.  
As with any conflict, racial slurs and derogatory terms for the enemy became commonplace 
with terms like Jap, Nip (Nippon) entering the common language.49  The dehumanization of the 
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opponent chiefly as primates, but also as other creatures was used in the halls of government.  
Everyone from heads of state like Winston Churchill to members of the bureaucracy referred to 
the Japanese in animalistic terms.  Beyond this, the peoples of Asia were lumped together 
eschewing any sense of nationalism or culture.  Americans perceived the Japanese not as a kind 
of national enemy but as a horde that would sweep aside Western civilization and project a 
“yellow empire” across the globe.50 
 In World War II and beyond, this fear of a “yellow menace” was part of the American 
world view and became integrated into foreign policy of the day.  While in World War II it was 
applied to Japan, only a few years before this had been projected onto China.  Following the 
war, it was projected back onto communist China under Mao.  This fear of a yellow horde 
invading the sweeping across the Pacific and then into American homes, was perceived as a 
very real and present danger within the United States.  The idea of the “yellow horde” can be 
traced back to the first American foray into the Pacific.  While certainly this idea was largely 
unfounded, it exerted a very powerful influence over American society through books, plays, 
films, and sensationalist journalism.51  Books such as those written by Homer Lea about the evil 
and insidious Dr. Fu Manchu captivated audiences with his adaptation of western technology, 
his mysterious Eastern sorcery, and his command of the yellow horde terrified western readers 
on a fundamentally racial level.  In this way, Japan as the rising power in Asia surpassed the 
menace previously accorded to China rather than merely replacing it.52  This idea of the horde 
continued into the era of the Cold War with the conflicts in both Korea and Vietnam. 
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 The expansion of American power in the centuries leading up to the Second World War 
was a gradual process, but with the end of World War II it became meteoric.  Following the 
defeat of Japan in 1945, the United States reached the pinnacle of its power in the Pacific, 
attaining a level of power that had been had dreamed of by ambitious men like the Roosevelts, 
but up to this point was unprecedented.  The dream of an American empire in the Pacific was 
realized.  While certainly this empire was never labeled or considered as such by the men who 
had brought it into being, it was an empire nonetheless.  Having attained hegemony over this 
massive region, the United States moved from an episode in conquest to an exercise in 
maintaining that empire.  The Americans would have no time to enjoy the spoils of war as it 
were, for just as soon as the world’s largest scale war had ended, the United States would 
involve itself in the diplomatic struggle with the Soviet Union that would come to be known as 
the Cold War.  While this war is considered to have been a Mexican standoff on the grandest 
scale imaginable with little actual conflict, the Pacific and the east in general became the arena 
where the Cold War became hot.  The first entry of the United States into this new realm of 
international political struggle would be manifested by the American military action in Korea 
that would change the course of American society for years to come.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24 
 
Racial Apathy: Civil Rights and the Eisenhower Administration’s Domestic Policy 
Following World War II, an era of suspicion and fear began to sweep across the globe.  
The two major propagators of this Cold War were two allies during World War II; the United 
States and the Soviet Union.  Both feared the strategic goals and intentions of the other, and 
felt that an ideological struggle for the soul of the world was at stake.  As a result, both nations 
employed every strategy short of direct conflict to increase power over the other.  This 
antagonism was on display for all to see, particularly in Europe.  However, the popular public 
perception that the Cold War was only a contest of wills, or an espionage conflict waged in 
Europe, is not accurate.  In the Pacific theater, the Cold War became quite hot both with the 
conflict in Korea and later in the jungles of Vietnam.  Having defeated Japan and its imperial 
ambitions, the United States now faced what it perceived as the next great threat, an 
international communist movement led by the Soviet Union.  In the context of this belief, 
American policy makers like John Foster Dulles, Dean Acheson, and President Harry Truman 
perceived that any communist regime posed a clear and present danger to American national 
security.  
This idea first came into being under the Truman administration, as the post-World War 
II balance of power was being determined.  In a 1947 speech to congress, Truman asserted that 
it was the duty and responsibility of the United States to prevent the spread of communism 
worldwide as a threat to the continued existence of the “free world”.53  While this thinking was 
initially applied to Europe, it spilled over into considerations of preserving the balance of power 
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in Asia. This thinking became even more critical following the rise of the Chinese Communist 
Party to power in 1949, and the establishment of the People’s Republic of China.  This was seen 
as a catastrophe in the American policy of containment outlined by Truman and the conflict 
that developed in Korea was viewed in the context of preventing the “fall” of any more 
territories to communist dominance.54  Initially in Korea, the United States 1950 invasion and 
push to the Yalu River on the peninsula’s northern border was a crushing victory for the United 
States.  However, the entrance of 500,000 Chinese “volunteers” pushed American forces back, 
and after three years of hard fighting, resulted in a stalemate.  While, the conflict became 
increasingly unpopular at home, government officials perceived it as an important effort 
internationally by the United States to prevent the spread of Communist conspiracy.  However, 
the unpopularity of the war became associated with Truman and in 1953 he was succeeded by 
former Supreme Allied commander Dwight D. Eisenhower.  In a document from the first year of 
Eisenhower’s presidency it becomes plain to see that this thinking, carried over to his 
administration.   
The document in question is a report by the National Security Council on the role that 
the United States should play in Southeast Asia.  The most noteworthy aspect of this document 
is the language.  The communist movement throughout the document is viewed as something 
international that transcends borders.  Rather than viewing any such movement as nationalist, 
Asian communist movements were instead perceived as puppets of the Soviet Union.55  
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Furthermore, the movement of Asians towards communism proved particularly problematic 
given existing racial fears of a “yellow horde” that was now represented by the PRC. This 
perception of global conspiracy only increased fears of communist subversion domestically, as 
Civil Rights movements swept across the United States began to gain steam in the early years of 
the Cold War.  
During the Cold War, the racial attitudes held by the citizens of the United States played 
a significant part of American foreign relations and policy.  In order to claim the moral high 
ground in their “war” with communism, the United States was forced to examine and seek to 
change the race dynamics within their own country.  These dynamics needed to be changed to 
reflect the public mission of the United States, establishing freedom and equality globally, in 
the domestic sphere.  In the wake of World War II, solving domestic racism became a greater 
part of the national agenda.  Campaigns were launched to support equality for all.  Racism, 
after all had been a hallmark of fascism in Nazi Germany and what could be more un-American 
than that?56  However, immediately following World War II, racially motivated crimes against 
returning African-American veterans swept through the southern United States.  In response to 
the lynching and other crimes, often at the hands of police, President Truman felt ever 
mounting pressure from the Afro-American community to bring an end to the issues plaguing 
the nation.  However, the pressure was not only felt at home, it was also felt internationally 
with criticism from other nations. 
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In the wake of World War II, with the United States becoming the outspoken 
international voice of self-determinism, the lack of rights and representation for minorities was 
an embarrassment and a liability.  It was difficult for the Truman administration to label 
communism as an oppressive regime when the rights of African Americans were far less than 
white Americans, particularly in the south.  The policies of segregation and Jim Crowe were 
particularly damning evidence in this regard.57  These lack of rights were noted by papers 
internationally, particularly in Asia.  This was due to the fresh memory of the brutal and racially 
charged conflict in the Pacific between Japan and the US.  Papers from Fiji to China all 
condemned American policies towards “the Negro Question”.58  The attention that this 
garnered significantly undermined the Americans’ claims of supporting self-determination.  
Many Asian peoples had experienced the exact opposite as the United States demonstrated 
throughout the Cold War period that self-determinism only applied in cases in which it led to 
“democracy”.  Furthermore and most alarmingly for Americans, the discrimination against 
blacks in the South was capitalized on by the USSR in the national Soviet newspaper Trud.59  In 
articles about the tensions in the United States, Trud simply reported American articles on the 
issue.60   It was through events like the inssertion of a prominent Soviet newspaper into the 
discussion that the link between racial issues within the United States and the external Cold 
War became linked.  With the condemnation of US inaction in “the Negro Question” by the 
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USSR, the Civil Rights movement was placed in an awkward spot in which criticizing the US 
government could be presented as a communist plot.  On the other hand, the American 
government had to reevaluate its stance on Civil Rights issues as they undermined the 
credibility of American ideology worldwide.  
In discussing and criticizing the treatment of African-Americans within American society 
gained the Soviets a great deal of credibility within the non-white third world communities.  
The sentiments condemning imperialism outlined and practiced by the USSR, contrasted with 
the practices of the United States that were observed by leaders of third world nations.61  
Additionally, the treatment of foreign dignitaries of color also presented an embarrassment to 
the United States.  Being asked to attend a conference in Mississippi, the Haitian Secretary of 
Agriculture was refused entry to the hotel where the conference was being held and was 
accommodated elsewhere.  As a result the secretary left the conference in a rage.62  While 
nations like Haiti where not powers on the world stage, incidents such as this one were 
commonplace during the early years of the Cold War and severely damaged the prestige of the 
United States internationally.  Visiting foreign dignitaries were often given a type of honorary 
“white” status upon entering the United States.63 This status proved insulting these guests of 
the United States and presented a troubling portrait of American society to the international 
community.  The society that perpetuated these values of segregation and discrimination was 
one that Eisenhower and his administration were quite willing to allow to continue.  This was 
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not so much a belief in discrimination in and of itself, but instead in the society that 
perpetuated it.  
Eisenhower was born during the 1890’s while the suppression of Native Americans was 
still taking place in the western frontier of the United States.  Racial segregation was being 
implemented into American law with the Plessy vs. Ferguson case in 1896 and it was in this 
atmosphere that young Dwight was brought up.64  While it should be noted that Eisenhower 
did not demonstrate a propensity for racial discrimination, he was not someone who differed 
from popular attitudes in American society during the times in which he lived.  Having been 
raised by a Texan in his mother, Eisenhower had a respect for the cause of the Confederacy and 
the “genteel southern tradition”.  While Eisenhower condemned racial violence in the South 
during his presidency, his leanings towards white southern society can be clearly seen in a 1958 
new conference he delivered.   
“From babyhood I was raised to respect the word ‘Confederate’-very highly I might add- 
and for hoodlums such as these to describe themselves as any part or relation to the 
Confederacy of the mid-nineteenth century is, to my mind, a complete insult’.  These 
were not the words of a man much troubled by regional racial traditions, like the slavery 
at the heart of that honored Confederacy.”65  
While this particular instance may paint Eisenhower as biased against racial equality, it seems 
that he simply did not consider it of any great importance.  A piece of evidence that adds 
nuance to the perceptions of race that Eisenhower held is his frequent denouncement of 
blatant racial bigotry by members of his staff or administration.66  However, apart from these 
episodes of private condemnation, Eisenhower quite simply felt uncomfortable in addressing 
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issues of race and removed any elements from his speeches and other public appearances that 
dealt with racial issues.67  The one member of his staff who was African American, Frederic 
Morrow, was told by Chief of Staff Wilton Persons to refrain from any discussion of race or civil 
rights around the president.  Whether this order came from the Chief of Staff or from 
Eisenhower himself is unclear.68  What is clear is that race relations for the Eisenhower 
administration were the proverbial elephant in the room.   However, during his time in office 
Eisenhower realized certain aspects of American society reflected poorly on American 
international prestige and sought to do away with old practices.  Most notable of these was the 
integration of the military.   
The American armed forces were already implementing racial integration by the time 
Eisenhower took office in 1953, which had been introduced by the Truman administration in 
1948.   This formed a portion of society outside of the usual standards of segregation and 
allowed for a racially inclusive culture to flourish in the American military.  Despite this federal 
institution that was adapting to the modern world of the Cold War rapidly, the rest of American 
society was slower to embrace change.  However, change arrived in the form of the Brown vs 
the Board of Education court case. 
Upon the 1954 ruling by the Supreme Court in favor of eliminating racial segregation, 
the decision was framed in the context of the Cold War by members of the administration.  The 
decision would “stun and silence America’s Communist traducers behind the Iron Curtain.”69  
Once again the Eisenhower administration demonstrated that its policy of avoiding the human 
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rights and moral context of the Civil Rights Movement in favor of one focused instead 
internationally.  Indeed the decision of the court was considered in this context as a way to 
promote the American battle for freedom against Communist tyranny.  It was important for the 
Eisenhower administration that African-Americans made strides with their civil rights during 
this period. This would in turn endorse the American political system as superior to that of 
communism.  Therefore, actions like the Brown decision were of vital importance to proving 
this point on the world stage.  Therefore, it was endorsed by the Eisenhower administration but 
only in so far as it promoted American foreign interests.  It was crucial to demonstrating that 
people of color in the United States enjoyed the privileges and freedoms the United States 
espoused internationally.70  While Brown and the Montgomery bus boycotts clearly 
demonstrated this, the escalating racially charged violence in the South served to work at cross 
purposes to the Eisenhower administrations agenda of showcasing the benefits of American 
democracy internationally.  However, as he had done his entire term in office, Eisenhower and 
his administration continued to skate around the issue of racial inequality, avoiding any 
discussion of it unless absolutely necessary.  Despite the policy of avoiding involvement in racial 
issues, the Eisenhower administration was forced to face these issues head on with the Little 
Rock crisis in 1957.   
The white southern reaction to the integration of nine black students into Central High 
School in Little Rock Arkansas showed the world how entrenched American racial 
discrimination was.71  The governor and school officials first attempted to use the Arkansas 
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National Guard to prevent the students from entering the school, and when ordered to cease 
and desist, they turned to the crowd of white southerners who closed down the school in 
protest.  Faced with a clear usurping of federal power, Eisenhower had no choice but dispatch 
the 101st Airborne to restore order.72  Even in this case, what Eisenhower objected to most 
strongly was not the prevention of the African-American students to enter the school, he 
instead opposed the mob’s actions as contrary to “public order”.  He once again refused to take 
a stand on a clear issue of racial equality.73 This damaged American claims abroad that Soviet 
influence represented a new era of communist colonialism.  Condemnation of colonialism on 
the part of the United States given their alignment in the Cold War.  
The United States closest allies in the Cold War were all former colonial powers, with 
France still fighting a war in Vietnam to retain its final grasp on colonial power.  This precedent 
made it difficult to swallow that the United States primary interest was in equality for all 
citizens when in reality, if the same people were living in the United States they would be 
denied many of the rights taken for granted by white American citizens.  Domestically, the 
Eisenhower administration did not seek to integrate the new era of freedom that was dawning 
on the world stage.  While they advocated self-determinism and democracy on the 
international stage, the administration did nothing to challenge the ruling ideology of white 
supremacy at home.  Although there were blows stuck for the cause of Civil Rights during 
Eisenhower’s term in office such as Brown v. Board of Education and the Little Rock nine, in the 
whole the rhetoric and actions of his administration demonstrated his apathy towards racial 
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change.74  While this cold apathy was experienced on the home front, the racial battle 
intensified on the international stage in the context of the Cold War as Eisenhower and his 
administration laid the groundwork for American involvement in Vietnam.   
The Vietnam War in and of itself was not necessarily about race.  However, many of the 
policies and attitudes that led the United States into conflict in Vietnam are.  The way in which 
Vietnam and other third world nations is what made an impact on policy making decisions.  The 
NSC labeled the leaders of these third world nations as “immature and unsophisticated with 
respect to the issues that still divide the world today.”75  This disdain for the leadership of the 
third world is reflected by this attitude in tone of condescension that is demonstrated by the 
Eisenhower administration, particularly in examining the language concerning the developing 
involvement in Vietnam.  This language places the United States firmly above the Vietnamese 
and demonstrates conceptions of Anglo-Saxon superiority were transposed on thinking about 
Vietnam.      
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The Final Leap: Race and Vietnam 
As The United States was embroiled in escalating racial tensions at home, the 
Eisenhower administration turned its gaze towards fighting the Cold War in Vietnam.  
Inextricable from the increased involvement were the events occurring in regards to the 
African-American community.  With a large part of the domestic population at home in a state 
of protest and civil disobedience, securing the Cold War internationally became even more 
crucial to demonstrating American ideological superiority.   
The seeds for American involvement in Vietnam can be traced back to the end of World 
War II and the final days of the Presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt.  Initially, Roosevelt 
supported the idea of establishing a self-determined state free of the yoke of colonialism.  As 
the end of the war drew near, Roosevelt changed his opinion adopting the all too familiar 
stance that the people of Vietnam were not yet politically mature enough to run their 
country.76  He argued that they would need twenty to thirty years in order to be able to 
properly handle the responsibility however, he refused to take the role of mentor and passed 
the buck to the French in reinstating their colony in Indochina.77  It was during this period that 
the French colony, previously a tertiary objective to the United States, came to the fore of the 
Cold War.  While intrinsically and politically insignificant for the United States, in the context of 
the larger Cold War Vietnam was given significance by policy makers and Cold War theorists like 
Dean Acheson.  Acheson served as secretary of state and was instrumental in shaping Cold War 
policy for the United States.  It was Acheson who first proposed the strategy of containing and 
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preventing the spread of communism.  This new Cold War coincided with the passing of 
responsibility of serving as the primary political and military power of the west. 
 This was a role that had been fulfilled for years by the British Empire through their vast 
infrastructure of global naval bases.  These outposts served both to protect British economic 
and colonial interests abroad, but also served the crucial role of acting as a “power of last 
resort”.78  This new role for the American government was primarily taken on by Acheson who 
took a much more Atlanticist approach by developing strong treaty relationships with European 
nations, and initially adopting a European colonial approach to their foreign policy.  As a result 
of the inherent belief that America had a duty to establish hegemony internationally, the 
United States had a duty to become more involved internationally. In Europe, US allies 
dominated the continent and through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the United States 
shared power with these allies. However, in the Pacific there was no organization comparable 
to NATO.  Despite the fact that SEATO was established in 1954, it had none of the cooperative 
power and relied solely on the United States for relevance.  Therefore, if the United States 
wished to exert its influence over the Pacific, it would have to act unilaterally.  The British had 
given up their interest in the region and in the colonial project, while France was entrenched in 
colonial war in both Indochina and Tunisia.  This ensured that the United States not only took 
the lead in Asia following the French defeat in Vietnam, but was guaranteed to do it virtually 
alone.   
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Unlike in its previous engagements in Asia like the Philippines, World War II, or Korea, 
the United States inched into war in Vietnam.  It began with financial and political support for 
the French colonial project.79    Then it was espionage networks and advisors to the South 
Vietnamese government following the Geneva Accords dividing the country into North and 
South Vietnam.  Finally the Gulf of Tonkin incident in 1965 brought a decade of tension to a 
head and the war in Vietnam began in earnest.  However, before that fateful year, the 
Eisenhower regime played a crucial role in keeping the Diem regime afloat in South Vietnam.  In 
addition to the previously discussed meeting between Eisenhower and Diem, the figures 
outlining the true extent of Southern reliance on both military and financial support from the 
United States is astounding.  The CIA ran operations throughout the country to support his 
regime, and the American government made a huge financial investment within the country.  
By the end of the Eisenhower years, the United States was paying 85 percent of the military 
budget for South Vietnam as well as subsidizing 80 percent of their imports.80  The level of 
American support demonstrates their commitment to preserving the integrity of South 
Vietnam.  However, what were the motives behind this commitment?  Was it for freedom, 
democracy, and self-determinism? Or were there ulterior motives?  
In an NSC report from 1953, the commitment of America to assisting the French in 
Vietnam is discussed.  Following a meeting on September 8th, America decided to commit 385 
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million dollars to the French cause.81   This funding was done covertly by removing it from a 
number of existing aid programs.  Additionally, the money taken from these programs was on 
top of the 400 million dollars already appropriated by congress to aid the French in the 
conflict.82  All told this 785 million dollars would equal roughly 6.8 billion dollars in 2015.  This 
large financial commitment by the United States established the American investment in the 
prosecution of conflict in Vietnam.  To the Eisenhower administration, this policy of supporting 
the troops of another nation was an effective way to prevent the spread of communist 
aggression while preventing America from becoming involved in another potential conflict so 
soon after the end of the Korean War.83  However this would change following the defeat of 
French forces at Dien Bien Phu expulsion from their former colony.   
With the removal of the French from Vietnam following the 1954 Geneva Accords, the 
newly divided Vietnam became two new nations.  While the country was divided into North and 
South Vietnam this solution was only meant to be a temporary one.  Two years following the 
partition national elections would be held to decide the fate of the country’s political future, 
whether Communist or “Free”.  However, the United States had no intention of allowing the 
Communist North, which would win any freely held election in a landslide, to gain control over 
the entire country.  This would be a great threat to the interests of the United States in Asia, 
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namely their economic market in Japan.84  Therefore, in order to ensure Japan’s security, the 
United States needed to maintain a sympathetic government in the newly formed South 
Vietnam.  The man they turned to fill this role was Ngo Dinh Diem.  With this decision, the 
United States fundamentally went against their professed principles of self-determinism to 
prop up Diem’s tyrannical regime.    
In a telegram from the US Department of State to the Saigon embassy, the language 
that establishes American dominance is plain to see.  In the telegram, one point in the 
objectives and orders for the embassy is to replace the Vietnamese police force and military if it 
seems to be ineffective with a police force and military answerable to the Americans.  
Furthermore, the US forces should gain control of the South and dictate how the country is 
run.85  This not only goes against the American principle of self-determinism but has racial 
undertones to it.  The document demonstrates a fundamental mistrust of the South 
Vietnamese to protect and further interests of the United States within Vietnam.  Given racial 
tensions and attitudes towards non-whites in America during 1954, a factor in this attitude is 
almost certainly related to a matter of racial mistrust.  It was believed that Diem, as a man 
educated in America would be the only way the US could have control over South Vietnam.  
Additionally Diem had no real base of power within Vietnam and his power within the country 
was the result of the great deal of financial, military, and political influence that Eisenhower 
administration was able to apply within Southeast Asia.  In a confidential meeting with 
                                                     
84 Richter, Bryan. The Hidden Architect: Dwight Eisenhower's Cold War Policies and the Vietnam 
War. 2014. Pg. 6.  
85 Telegram from US Department of State to Saigon Embassy, October 22, 1954.  J. Lawton 
Collins Papers, Special Mission to Vietnam Series, Policy Papers, Dwight D. Eisenhower 
Presidential Library, Abilene Kansas. Pg. 2. 
39 
 
President Eisenhower in 1957, the depth of the Diem’s dependence upon American support 
becomes plain. 
In this meeting Diem states directly that the preservation of his state is entirely 
dependent on American aid, particularly financially and militarily.  He stresses time and again 
throughout the conversation that without American aid that his country will collapse.86  The 
fact that Diem’s regime is so reliant on American support is telling about their understanding of 
the situation in Vietnam.  The United States fundamentally misunderstood what the will of the 
Vietnamese people was, instead decided that they knew what was best for Vietnam.  As the 
leaders of the Free World in the Cold War, surely they knew the best way in which to make a 
backwards and primitive nation like Vietnam modern and civilized. Furthermore, it was believed 
that not only was Vietnam primitive and backwards, but that it represented a larger global 
communist conspiracy.   
Following the Chinese entrance into the Korean War in 1950, the United States came to 
believe all the more strongly in this notion of a global communist movement and this certainty 
affected the way in which the United States perceived Vietnam.  The tiny country in Southeast 
Asia became, in the eyes of the Eisenhower Administration, the battleground upon which the 
Cold War would be fought.  However, Eisenhower wanted to avoid becoming involved in 
another land war during his time in office, having just extricated the United States from 
stalemate in Korea.  However, the primary concern in Vietnam was ensuring that the leader of 
South Vietnam would be willing to take directives from his paternalistic American allies.  
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Without, the oversight of the United States how could it be certain that these Asians would 
know how to lead their country away from communism? This mistrust of non-white national 
leaders led the United States to insert itself farther and farther on the road to conflict in 
Vietnam.  An important turning point was the drafting of NSC policy 5809 in 1958. 
“Because these countries do not have the capability of creating armed forces which 
could effectively resist large-scale external aggression, the United States will be required 
to provide a basic shield against Communist aggression.  For the foreseeable future, 
local will to resist aggression will depend on conviction in Southeast Asia that United 
States will continue its support and will maintain striking forces adequate to counter 
aggression in Southeast Asia with the capabilities described in current basic national 
security policy.”87     
This policy provided an important precedent in regards to military involvement in Vietnam.  
NSC 5809 allowed for unilateral intervention in Vietnam to combat vague “communist 
aggression” without congressional approval.  This policy would come home to roost in 1968 
with President Lyndon B. Johnson and the Gulf of Tonkin incident. 
Following the Gulf of Tonkin incident in August of 1964, the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution 
was passed by Congress and gave executive powers to Johnson to initiate a conflict within 
Vietnam.  In the resolution Johnson’s powers in relation to Southeast Asia were threefold.  First 
the president had the ability to respond to attacks on American naval vessels with any 
measures to prevent them from reoccurring.  Second the United States was prepared to engage 
in any military action to protect any region that fell under the SEATO Treaty.  Third the 
resolution would continue until the chief executive deemed that peace and security had been 
brought to the region.88  The language present in this resolution, especially section two, are a 
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reiteration of NSC 5809 and the statements of Eisenhower outlining American commitment to 
Southeast Asia.  This resolution is concrete proof of the lasting effects of Eisenhower’s 
administration on the Vietnam War.  The Gulf of Tonkin resolution was nearly of decade of 
American foreign policy under Eisenhower embodied in a single document.89  The racial 
components of these policies are clear to see when examined in the context of past American 
presidents and Eisenhower’s view of race domestically. 
 
Conclusion 
 American race relations have dominated the path of American Expansionism and the 
perpetuation of its Pacific empire.  These racial perceptions were, however, nuanced and 
complicated.  More than merely complicated, they were in constant motion.  What initially 
applied to a certain group of people, might shift to a different group of people the next 
moment.  These shifting perceptions were particularly clear in how attitudes regarding Native 
Americans were transplanted onto Filipinos upon the entrance of the United States into 
colonial war with the former Spanish possession.  The inhuman portrayal reflected the same 
views held by soldiers during the Indian Wars of the 19th century.  If the Filipinos were defeated 
by the United States in the same manner as the Native Americans, then they must possess the 
same level of racial worth.90  These concepts were then exported upon to the greatest 
challenge to American power in the Pacific, the ascendant Pan-Asianism of the Japanese in the 
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20th century.  To combat this threat, it was crucial that the populace of the United States 
perceive World War II in the same racial context as the suppression of the Filipinos.  The fear of 
a “yellow peril” that would sweep aside western civilization and the most cherished aspects of 
American society ensured that the United States bought strongly into war in the Pacific.   
 Following the defeat of Japan, a new threat in the form of global communism needed to 
be addressed and to this end, perceptions of race again came to the fore.  However, with 
emergence of the Civil Rights movement in the early 1950’s this movement ceased to be merely 
a domestic issue and took on international significance.  The taking up of the banner of Civil 
Rights by the Communist nations of the world inextricably tied communism and the Civil Rights 
movement together in the eyes of American policy makers.  As the United States faced 
mounting pressure from the global community, it was forced to address issues of racial 
inequality.  The best way for the United States to combat these allegations was to make 
changes and by doing so promote the American system of democracy.  While this certainly did 
push forward the cause of the Civil Rights in the eyes of the federal government, it removed the 
moral and human rights component of the movement and presented it in a purely political 
context.  The Eisenhower and his administration were quite willing to pass the buck on dealing 
with America’s racial issues and only did so when completely necessary.  This discussion of race 
and racial issues extended into foreign policy in Asia and Vietnam and worked off a “white 
man’s burden” style policy to civilize the people of Asia by Americanizing and democratizing 
them.  This fundamental racial mistrust embedded in American policy making led to the 
drafting of policies like NSC 5809.  This in turn enabled the executive to involve American 
troops on his own initiative in Vietnam which was indeed done under President Lyndon B. 
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Johnson.  Therefore, the establishment of the American Empire in the Pacific is one of racial 
prejudice and inherent white superiority.  This lens was used by the United States to justify 
involvement in conflicts from the Philippines to the conflict in Vietnam that really began in 1954 
following the defeat of the French at Dien Bien Phu.  The United States took up the torch that 
was set aside by Great Britain following World War II.  The torch of western civilization that 
demanded subjugation and adaptation by the “lesser peoples” of the planet in the new 
American Hegemony that was engaged in an battle with communism for the ideological soul of 
the world.  It was this mandate that led the United States into Vietnam and it was this reason 
that American troops planted their boots in the red soil of Vietnam and went on patrols into 
the jungle.  It was for this reason that 20 year old Donald Richter lost his life on March 26, 1969 
some 13,000 miles from his home in Sheboygan Wisconsin.  In the way that these events have 
shaped my family, they have also served to shape generations of citizens of all nations.  
Americans, Filipinos, Native Americans, and Vietnamese have experienced the impact of 
American Expansionism, the effects of which continue to influence us in the present day.   
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